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Abstract The primary aim of the present book is to clarify the nature of some basic 
misunderstandings that afflict both the interpretation and management of modern 
dynamic societies. The roots of this theoretical and practical confusion are identi- 
ﬁed with the adoption within the social sciences of the method of observation and 
veriﬁcation. This may seem surprising in the light of the fact that the triumph of this 
method facilitated the emergence of the modern natural (and mechanical) sciences.  
And  in  fact,  just  this  success  has  propelled  the  extension  of  the  observation- 
veriﬁcation  method  into  the  social  sciences,  where  it  is  today  dominant.  The 
deﬁciencies of this method in the analysis of social reality are, however, masked by 
the trappings of scientiﬁc rigour imparted, which is often enhanced by additional 
borrowing of method from the mathematical and formal sciences. It must be rec-  
ognized  that  the  observation-veriﬁcation  works  well  when  applied  to  quasi-
stationary  societies,  where  the  key  hypothesis  of  the  repetitiveness  (or  quasi-
repetitiveness)  of events  typical  of the natural  sciences  is  fulﬁlled.  But with the 
advent  of  modern  dynamic  society,  itself  very  much  an  effect  of  the  great  
advancement of the natural and formal sciences, the failure of the methodologies of 
these sciences with regard to the analysis of social reality has become increasingly 
marked,  its  consequences  ever  more  devastating.  My  book  Methodological  
Misconceptions in the Social Sciences was dedicated to an accurate analysis of this 
embarrassing situation and a consideration of ways to remedy it. Unfortunately, the 
observation-veriﬁcation  method  continues  to  enjoy  great  prestige  in  the  social 
studies. This is mainly due to the fact that it  is based on de facto situation with 
regard  to  established  interests  and  hence  enjoys  the  favor  of  dominant  social 
classes.  The  present  book,  therefore,  sets  out  to  provide  a  simple  and  clear 
description  of  the  situation,  the  related  confusion,  and  the  ways  to  remedy the 
problem.
Keywords  The question of method A third method for social studies versus the 
current  methods  of  natural  and  logic-formal  sciences  Social  change  versus 
repetitiveness Observational view, as congenial  to established interests of dom- 
inant social classes
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1   Introduction 2
This booklet discusses some of the main problems of global society, indicates their 
roots and offers solutions that will often prove to be necessary. The contemporary 
world is afflicted and, I dare say, increasingly disturbed by the absence of those 
solid reference points that are indispensable for the governing of human societies 
in the face of the great changes caused by ever greater technological progress. We 
shall see that such global disorientation is not inevitable, for it arises from some 
basic methodological  lacunae of  social  thought;  and we attempt to remedy the 
situation by way of a methodological revision allowing us,  ﬁrst of all, to deﬁne 
scientiﬁcally both solid reference points and the path of their evolution through the 
various historical ages.
I’ll explore various, sometimes amusing applications of results presented in my 
book  Methodological misconceptions in the social sciences,1 which can be con- 
sidered the scientiﬁc foundation of the present essay. A large part of these appli- 
cations carry a utopian flavor, but they are nevertheless recommendations that 
arise from the pursuit of a rational and livable organization of modern dynamic 
societies  combined  with  some  substantial  ethical  improvement.  These  are 
recommendations  that  point  to  an  escape-route  from  some  failures  that  have 
always afflicted human societies.
A clariﬁcation of the title of this book is indispensable. The expression  ‘The 
necessity of...’ must not be intended as something that will necessarily happen. 
The achievement of the organizational necessities that this study underlines may 
require long lasting and extremely painful processes of trial and error and may 
even be indeﬁnitely blocked by the opposition of powerful contrary interests, if 
humanity  does not become conscious of those organizational necessities, a 
consciousness that current social thought seems unable to promote. The quantity 
of  studies carried out and statements  put  forward  in defense  or  denigration  of 
capitalism made by way of inspiration of the observational method appropriate to 
the natural sciences is impressive. But the able elusions on the subject that utilize, 
with a flavor of high scientiﬁc substance, the method of abstract rationality typical 
of logic-formal sci- ences, probably are even more insidious. I’ll try to overcome 
this unfortunate condition of social thinking.
In this essay I will relate an adventure in sidereal space. This literary expedient 
should facilitate understanding of the arguments and allow the reader to bypass the 
false problems and useless complications that cluster around the matter on Earth, 
where  reason  is  largely  devoted  to  improving  our  skills  at  treading  upon one 
another’s toes. But I suggest to social scientists that, soon after the reading of this  
introduction  and  the  section  that  follows  it,  they  turn  to  the  reading  of    the
1Students preferring details will probably be irritated by the concise treatment in this essay of 
problems abounding in theoretical complexity. But this brief essay, which is addressed to non-
specialist readers, is built upon deep and profound studies on such subjects as method, forms of  
power, economics, politics, ethics and law, as well a detailed historical analysis of social systems 
and  civilizations  considered  particularly  signiﬁcant  for  the  understanding  of  the  societies  in 
which we are living. For these studies, which also employ advanced mathematical and statistical 
procedures, see, for example: Fusari (2014, Ekstedt and Fusari (2010), Fusari  (2000).
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Appendix, where some methodological equivocations afflicting social sciences are 
discussed. Eventually, our sidereal perspective might even prove useful in under- 
standing the needs and habits of extraterrestrial societies that humanity will sooner 
or later encounter.
We shall narrate a scientiﬁc counterpoint, a story of the adventure of science 
that is topsy-turvy in relation to the world in which we actually live. To be precise,  
we shall imagine that in the extraterrestrial society where the actions described 
take place, the development of the social sciences has preceded, influenced and 
placed breaks upon that of the natural sciences; a marked contrast with our Earth,  
upon which the very opposite has happened. The point of this conceit is that it  
facilitates a clear and simple perspective upon the method of the social sciences; 
this  being  a  vitally  important  scientiﬁc  matter  that,  nevertheless,  is  all  too 
frequently presented in abstruse and complicated forms by current  analyses.
We must consider our extraterrestrial interlocutors lucky; the backwardness of 
the social sciences with respect to the natural (and mechanical) sciences has, on 
Earth,  reached an alarming level,  which causes  a technical  and cognitive short 
circuit between the two branches of knowledge, thereby increasingly reducing the 
human capacity to organize and manage social systems. This transforms techno- 
logical conquests into instruments of destruction and threatens to destroy the very 
possibility of life on Earth. The devastating wars and other follies that have 
troubled human history are without precedent even among the wildest beasts, and 
this despite man’s proud assertion of being gifted with reason, the most important 
and true form of which—scientiﬁc reason—has yielded exceptional technological 
achievements.2 Unfortunately, scientiﬁc reason is not able to help social relations 
because of deep methodological misconceptions.
Never has there existed on Earth a social order able to conjugate social justice,  
economic efﬁciency and a high and continuative rate  of growth  of production; 
notwithstanding the fact that such an order is perfectly feasible, as Chap.  8 will 
show. The domination of the economic system and market relations in modern 
dynamic societies generates very perverted effects. It is distressing to consider the 
misfortunes, among which the calamity of involuntary unemployment ranks high, 
that humanity began to procure with great vigor from the time we arrived at the 
capacity to produce material wealth at a good pace. Such considerations oblige us 
to  dedicate  much  space  to  showing  how  the  services  of  the  market  may  be 
preserved  and  yet  made into  an  instrument  at  the  service  of  human  societies, 
instead of acting as a greedy despot exploiting and manipulating men and their 
things.
The lack of ethical progress from the beginning of social life and in comparison 
with the immense progress of human knowledge and technological achievements, 
and despite the great efforts of moralists and the religious, is astonishing. We shall
2A great student of history wrote: “Indeed history is no more than a list of the crimes, the follies 
and the misfortunes of mankind” (see Gibbon 2000, p. 81). This will oblige us, much later in the 
essay, to address some objections to the famous booklet by Erasmus of Rotterdam, ‘In Praise of 
Folly’.
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see that it is possible to reduce this gap; more precisely,  we shall see that it is 
possible to scientiﬁcally develop a large proportion of ethical questions and, in this 
way, to lead man to virtue through rules suggested and approved by reason. In 
fact, it can be shown that the rational and efﬁcient organization of social systems 
cannot be achieved in the absence of some fundamental ethical imperatives. The 
knowl-  edge  of  these  imperatives  allows  the  moderation  of  even  the  sharpest 
human conflicts, caused by collisions among personal interests as well as among 
different civilization forms: conflicts against which the golden rule of reciprocity 
and  the  love  for  one’s  neighbor  are  impotent,  as  everybody  is  inclined  to 
reciprocate and love according to his own way and convenience. Unfortunately the 
dominant social  thought  denies  the  possibility  of  scientiﬁcally  treating  ethical 
values; and this feeds a growing ethical vagueness in the modern dynamic and 
global society that thwarts the efforts of moralists and the religious.3
Human virtue is strongly influenced by the character of social organization, in 
particular the forms of power. If we assume, under the influence of observational 
methodologies, that the forms of power are inevitably obliged to assume the usual 
dress  of  domination-power,  instead  of  service-power,  Machiavelli’s  teaching 
becomes irrefutable and the dominated people can choose only between rebellion 
and, as indicated by Guicciardini, managing in the light of particular and personal 
interests. Any pulpit is impotent against the consequent corruption: the preachers 
of virtue are condemned to throw their words to the wind and their listeners are 
kept in  check  by  spontaneous  behaviour  and  the  working  of  Mandeville’s 
paradox.4 At  least  this  is  so  if  we  are  unable  to  propose  some  rules  and 
organizational  forms that  lead to the uprooting of domination-power and the 
corruption that it forges, in favor of what we denominate service-power.
Everywhere we turn our eyes, we see that domination-power darkens and holds 
in subjection the liberating force of reason: in the life of the man in the street and 
in  the  work  of  great  statesmen,  legislators,  judges,  businessmen  and 
administrators. Unfortunately, the fact that existing social relations and the whole 
of history are deeply permeated by domination forms means that the prevailing 
mere  observa-  tional  method implies  the acceptance  of  domination-power;  this 
clearly shows that such a method, if used in the investigation of society, acts as    a 
distorting trap.
Volumes  have  been  written  reproving  the  exploitation  of  man by  man and 
tremendous revolutions have been set in motion in order to do away with it; but 
the problem has never yet  been faced  with due clearness  on the more general 
question of the degeneration of the forms of power into relations of domination, 
of which
3L. Pellicani, in the ﬁnal chapter of his main work, expressed great concern for the instability that  
modern dynamic societies derive from the chronic instability of ethical values (See Pellicani 
1988). An instability that, we add, is largely fed by the growing scientiﬁc vagueness on   ethics.
4Such a paradox underlines “the baseness of the ingredients that taken together give the healthy  
mixture of  a  well  ordered society”  and, as Mandeville  puts it  in his poetical  account  of  the 
discontented beehive: “so every part was full of vice, but the whole were a paradise… and…
living in the comfort in the absence of great vices is a useless UTOPIA” Mandeville (2000), pp. 
4, 13 and 20.
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exploitation is one of the consequences. The result has been that, notwithstanding 
the best intentions of so many would-be liberators, these revolutions have invari- 
ably  constructed  new  systems  of  domination  and  exploitation.  A  well  known 
booklet by G. Orwell gives a wonderful representation of such   behavior.5
This deceit has perhaps reached a terminal point. The conquests of the  open 
society have stirred up a great wish in the mind and heart of humanity, a desire for 
individual freedom. Such a wish, stimulated by subjective feelings and supported 
by  the  objective  evidence  that  individual  freedom  is  indispensable  for  self-
propulsive development,  will  raise  a  violent  wind of  renewal  in  global  world, 
mainly  in  the  immense  districts  where  the  individual  has  never  hitherto  had 
importance. Power forms will be the main casualties of the hurricane, which must 
therefore be violent and promises uncertain outcomes. We have to fear, but not 
despair. It is possible to do much better within the open society, which constitutes  
the most brilliant and promising social form that man has built till now. But the 
feelings and ethical impudence that have given rise to the open society can also 
wither  it,  while  its  frenetic  pace  threatens  to  crush  humanity,  its  author,  if  an 
institutional,  methodological  and cultural  revolution does not  circumvent  those 
feelings and teach humanity the way to govern its pace and   direction.
The considerations above oblige us to dedicate a brief reference to the most  
embarrassing  and  depressing  phenomenon  that  wraps  itself  around and within 
human life:  the evil in the world. Such a phenomenon has been intensively dis- 
cussed and analyzed by theologians, philosophers, historians, psychologists, psy- 
choanalysts, etc., but their discussions have been almost entirely in vain, for this is 
a problem without univocal solutions. In Voltaire’s Candide, James the Anabaptist 
says: “It seems that men have partly corrupted nature; they have not been born as 
wolves  but  wolves  they  have  become.  God  has  equipped  them  neither  with 
twenty-four pounder cannon nor with bayonets; but they have built cannons and 
bayonets to destroy themselves. To this account I could also add bankruptcy and 
justice that takes possession of bankrupts’  goods to subtract them to creditors”.6 
What  are  the reasons  behind so much self-damaging  behaviour?  A number  of 
philosophers have stated that man is by nature good but human institutions have 
transformed his natural goodness into instinctive aggressiveness and   wickedness;
but the reason why human goodness has given rise to such wicked institutions is 
not  clariﬁed.  Others  take  the  opposite  stance,  arguing  that  human  nature  is 
predomi- nantly and irreparably infested by bad instincts, and they deduce from 
this that humanity must be subjected to vigilant surveillance and governed with 
cynicism and deceit or at least,  and according to Augustin of Hippona, guided 
toward the De Civitate Dei.7
5See Orwell (2008).
6See Voltaire (2006), p. 26.
7See Augustin of Hippona (2000).
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    It seems to me that those arguments are not convincing. History shows, at every 
time and in every place, that humanity is by nature good and bad, the author of great 
rushes of generosity and of much greater  wickedness.  Logic and common sense 
suggest that such behavioural and existential dualism is an inevitable result of the 
limitations afflicting human nature. Well, in observing such mixtures of virtue and 
wickedness, students cannot avoid acknowledging that the human propensity to 
make mistakes due to our cognitive limitations together with our ‘freedom’ to make 
the  most  atrocious  errors  is  coupled  with  the  human  potential  to  scientiﬁcally 
understand the problems of the world and to so gain knowledge exponentially over 
time. Such potential is an important means for spiritual and material growth; but to 
be able to operate it is necessary that men are strictly subjected to the consequences 
of their actions, that is, are ‘responsible’ for them; in other words, it is required that 
in the use of command-power the notions of  ‘service’ and ‘responsibility’ replace 
that  of  ‘domination’.  Unfortunately,  a  number  of  institutions  and  even  ethical 
principles have been shaped much more under the influence of bad instincts than 
with the purpose of promoting  ‘responsibility’  and thereby increasing generosity 
and mutual well being. The notion of  ‘responsibility’, which should be a corner- 
stone of the studies on social systems and of the teaching of educational institutions, 
is  for  the  most  trampled  on  and  ridiculed.  And,  alas  for  the  large  majority  of  
moralists,  ‘responsibility’  ﬁnds  systematic  applications  almost  only  through  the 
automatisms of the competitive market, their great  enemy.
There is a great need of reason where the winds of passions and interests blow 
with strength, as is the case in social reality. But here it is important to underline 
the distinction between individual reason, which often acts as the servant of bad 
instincts, and scientiﬁc reason, which represents (as just seen) an important means 
for the improvement of human conditions but is subject to ambiguity if not based 
on steady and reliable methodological foundations. Unfortunately, social thought 
is lacking when it comes to method; largely in consequence of that the role of 
science in ethics is explicitly denied by the large majority of scholars. In effect 
(and as Chaps. 11 and 12 will show), current social teaching is constrained by the 
strait- jackets of being or daydreaming of what ought to be, and remains distant  
from any solution of the crucial methodological question for social science: how 
to combine being and doing, observational and organizational aspects but avoiding 
that the second is overwhelmed by the  ﬁrst.
  This essay is intended for an audience of rational people, in particular, the vast 
majority who are dominated by (and suffer the exploitation of) forms of power. It 
should  also  beneﬁt  those  who  consume  their  energies  in  pathetic  attempts  of 
domination; for even if they succeed in such a difﬁcult task, they are forced to 
wear  themselves  out  even  further  in  defending the paltry privileges  they have 
grasped and to suffer the humiliations inflicted on them by higher-ranked rulers. I 
take the liberty of reminding my readers who belong to the dominating class of 
Rousseau’s warning: “he who thinks to command others is no less enslaved    than 
them”.8 The
8See Rousseau (1962), p.  4.
present  book is,  however,  primarily addressed  to  the following two audiences: 
scholars and men of action engaged in solving the ever more complicated 
problems of human societies; and enthusiastic young people, humiliated but not 
defeated by their vain pursuit of crazy utopias, and whose enthusiasms may be 
durably  brightened  only  by  aid  of  the  torch  of  some  institutional  design 
illuminated by science. T. Nagel has written: “the problem of planning institutions 
able  to  warrant  the  equal  importance  of  every  person  without  charging  on 
individual  unacceptable  obligations  has  not  been  solved  yet”.9 Here  we  shall 
attempt to show that it is possible to organize social systems in such a way that, in 
Nagel’s  terms,  both the  resulting satisfaction  of  the  impersonal  motivations of 
each individual and the satisfaction of personal motivations will be very  high.
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Chapter 2
· · ·
· · · ·
· ·
The Scientiﬁc Frame of This Story
Abstract  Social  studies cannot  abstract  from reality,  as do mathematics and the 
logical-formal sciences, for the investigation of reality is precisely their object; yet  
nor can they adhere strictly to reality, as does the observation-veriﬁcation method. 
Put another way,  while too great  abstraction passes over the object of the social  
sciences, the ever intensifying rate of social change precludes employment of an 
observation-veriﬁcation method based upon the repetitiveness (or, in biology, the 
quasi repetitiveness) of events. Social reality is the product of the organizational 
action of man and his inventiveness, yet it is also deeply rooted in the basic content 
of situation. It follows that the method appropriate to the analysis of social reality 
must combine the observational  and organizational  views, thereby encompassing 
the  realms  of  both  being  and  doing.  Moreover,  that  method  must  be  able  to 
distinguish organizational necessities from choice-possibility and creativeness. This 
distinction is indispensable if we are to hope to discern the different currents and 
contributory streams within the flow of social change and capture basic and long-
lasting aspects of social systems. In this chapter we identify those basic elements 
fostering duration and those initiating the propulsive forces of social systems. These 
elements are denom- inated,  respectively,  functional  imperatives  and ontological 
imperatives.  We also underline the role of long-lasting choices in the history of 
civilizations. This allows us to make two steps.  Firstly,  to show how functional 
imperatives change over long periods, with their nature at any particular moment 
indicative of a particular historical age. Secondly, to delineate a theory of social and 
historic  processes  founded  on the  operation  and  interaction  of  functional 
imperatives,  ontological  imperatives  and  civilizations. Our methodological 
discussion encompasses also ethical values. These results are in stark contrast to the 
ethical  relativism that  contemporary analyses  are  obliged to embrace due to the 
innate incapacity of observation veriﬁcation method to allow a scientiﬁc treatment 
of values. Our methodological approach also takes note of the nature of forms of 
power and other organizational aspects of social systems.
Keywords  Galileian  dispute  Social  change  Observational  and  organizational 
views  Organizational  necessities  Choice-possibility  Creativeness  Functional 
imperatives  and  historical  ages  Ontological  imperatives  civilizations  Deep 
confusion on ethics
Chapter 3
Prologue of the Tale
· · · ·
Abstract  The prologue gives at  ﬁrst the reasons that have suggested and hence 
stimulated this research: a list of some main problems that trouble modern 
societies and underlines the urgency of remedying the growing incapacity of the 
social sciences to deal with them. The aim is to contribute to the birth of a science 
leading to the organization and management of a social order able to give solution 
to those problems. This highlights, among other things, the role and in some sense 
the necessity of a utopian attitude, but one concerned in a strict confrontation with 
reality. An attitude, that is, quite different from ingenuous utopianism or 
utopianism  used as a pretext, which have discredited utopia owing to the 
associated failures and disillusion and new kinds of exploitation.
Keywords  Migrations   Unemployment    Fundamentalism    Utopia    Feasible  
and necessary utopias
Chapter 4
On Landing on the Planet Dunatopia
Abstract  An analytical  expedient is  utilized to illuminate the nature of earthly 
problems: a confrontation with a twin planet of the Earth that is governed by a 
more enlightened social science and organization. More speciﬁcally,  in order to 
aid comprehension of the arguments of the book we imagine an extraterrestrial 
society where the development  of the social  sciences  has preceded that  of  the 
natural and logical-formal sciences, rather than—as is the case on our Earth—the 
other way around. Our confrontation between the organizational social forms and 
respective histories of our two planets points the path forward that we will follow 
in subse- quent chapters.
Keywords  An  analytical  expedient · The  twin  planet · Initial  exploration   ·
Dunatopian culture · A friendly people · A mild nature
Chapter 5
A Brief Historical Excursus
on the Evolution of Dunatopian 
Society and Its Institutions. Structural 
Organization and Innovative Dash
Abstract  Here we survey and discuss the institutional history of the new planet, 
which unveils an organizational evolution opposite to and much more judicious 
than the variegated institutional orders that have been built at different times on 
our Earth. As it happens, the geography of the new planet favored a rapid and 
almost  complete  uniﬁcation  of  the  country,  some  few  peripheral  areas 
notwithstanding. The initial result was the arising of a bureaucratic and centralized 
empire,  which  was  distinguished  by  high  stationary  efﬁciency,  but  unable  to 
develop further. The situation thus attained saw a well-equilibrated but stationary 
social order constantly threatened by various small but aggressive and dynamic 
neighboring communities. This threat convinced the ruling class of the empire that 
it  was necessary to sub- jugate these communities; but this proved impossible. 
Moreover, the long period of warfare that resulted made evident to this class the 
fragility of the almost stationary imperial order. Greatly concerned, the emperor 
established a committee of social science students to investigate the possibility of 
embodying  within the imperial  order  such institutions and ethical  features  that 
were deemed responsible for the surprising dynamism of the neighboring peoples. 
A great reformation was promoted to  incorporate,  internalize,  and embody the 
resulting design. It was clearly under- stood that this reform required development 
of the following factors: a new role for the initiative of the individual, this being a 
main source of versatility, diversiﬁcation and gratiﬁcation; the decentralization of 
decisional centers; the ferment of dissent and pluralism; tolerance as opposed to 
the  forced  consent,  homologation  and  indoctrination  practiced  by  the  hitherto 
bureaucratic and centralized empire. In a parallel line of its report, the committee 
urged the importance and possibility of conciliating the structural order, in which 
the empire excelled, with the innovation, behavioral versatility and motivation of 
neighboring  communities.  The  above  cir-  cumstances made it evident to all 
concerned that the idea of warranting equilibrated relations among sectors  is  a 
senseless  proposition  as  it  would  imply the  building of  tedious  and  stationary 
societies.  Some  hegemonic  sectors  must  always  exist  as  an  effect  of  the 
development  process  in  the  presence  of  human  knowledge  that  is  limited by 
deﬁnition. Humanity must discover a design that integrates and foster the 
development of both the calmness of reason and the madness of creative 
processes.
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The evolutionary path of non-omniscient people is characterized by innovative 
dash followed by structural organization.
Keywords Institutional orders · Centralized-bureaucratic orders · Homologation · 
Institutional decentralization · Versatility and diversiﬁcation · Pluralism · Tolerance · 
Evolutionary push · Innovative dash · Structural organization
Chapter 6
Power Forms and Their Practice 
in Dunatopia. Service-Power
and Domination-Power. Judicial Power
Abstract This chapter discusses the forms of power within societies, the particular 
modes  of  which  strongly  influence  the  character  and  behavior  of  domination 
forms  and  the  ethical  substance  of  social  orders.  It  is  made  clear  why  it  is 
imperative that the treatment of this delicate topic is based on the organizational 
point of view. The chapter also shows both the absurdity of the observational view 
in the social sci- ences and the reason why such absurdity persists, which is related 
to its implicit and  supine  acceptance  of  the  hegemony of  the  dominant  social 
classes. The need for a smooth passage from the bureaucratic and centralized or 
autocratic organization of the almost stationary old empire to a social organization 
that  is  able  to  develop  steadily,  and  without  succumbing  to  the  explosive 
voraciousness of neighboring particularistic communities, obliges us to engage in 
an accurate meditation on the power forms prevailing in both cases. History shows 
that  whatever  the character of  the organizational  forms of  societies,  they have 
always been governed by domination-power, that is, a form of power that feeds 
subjection,  arrogance  and  dejection.  To  reverse  this  situation,  we  oppose  to 
domination-power  the  notion  of  service-power,  that  is,  a  power  to  which 
correspond  functions  clearly  deﬁned  and  severely  subjected  to  well  deﬁned 
responsibility criteria for decisions taken and their results. Service-power entails 
that the discretionary power, which is inevitable in a world troubled by incessant 
changes, neither implies nor legitimates free will. It  is of great  importance that 
social organization rests on the basic notions of responsibility and service. In fact, 
the notion of service stimulates the sentiment of 
duty, while responsibility ensures motivation and satisfaction for what an 
individual does.  Service-power is a primary vehicle of morality,  efﬁciency and 
satisfaction, while domination-power is a main cause of acrimony, discontent and 
depravity. We underline  the abuse  of  power  that  afflicts  the  administration of 
justice, with a consequent injury of the proclaimed principle of the equality of all 
before the law. We also demonstrate the falsity of the defense of the free will of 
judges as essential  to  their  independence  and  show  that  the  contrary  is  true: 
independence in decisions both implies and generates responsibility for decisions 
taken, thereby avoiding degeneration in the use of command power. Finally, we 
highlight that success of the  fulﬁlled functions, as a counterpart of the 
attribution of responsibility, does not
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Chapter 7
The Planetary Political System 
of Dunatopian Society
Abstract  Further  deepening  of  our  reflections  on the  question of  power  must 
primarily concern political power, the supreme form of power entitled to use a 
binding force to impose the respect of law. Only elementary and primitive 
societies may dispense with this supreme command power and trust in the guiding 
power  of  tradition,  the  so  called  ‘power  of  society’.  Those  philosophies 
proclaiming the extinction of state power are senseless. The real problem we face 
stems from the need to control political power. To this end, we need to consider  
state  power  from  the  perspective  of  the  transformation  of  rude  forms  of 
domination-power to service-power; a transformation that, as far as I am aware, 
has never been properly considered by social thought. For social thought has at 
most predicated the abolition of power—a statement that, due to its impossibility, 
has represented in practice the best possible intellectual defense of domination-
power,  the hegemony of which is reinforced by the observational methodology 
that  induces  people  to  accept  domination-power under the strength of the 
observation of the continual presence of such a power in history.  A substantial 
way of controlling political power seems to be offered by the notion of  ‘popular 
sovereignty’ as the expression of a so called ‘general will’. But to give strength to 
such a notion it is necessary to deﬁne in a scientiﬁc (objective) way the content of 
the presumed general will. This is possible if we take recourse to the notion of 
organizational  necessities,  as  expressed  by  functional  imperatives  and  the 
associated social order. Note that such idea of the political power is something 
different  from the notion of democracy.  Democratic procedures concern choice 
possibility, not organizational necessity, which latter is rather a matter of science. 
The assertion that consensus facit iustum may cause great  equivocations:  the 
dominant classes can persuade people to give consent to the violation of important 
organizational  necessities  if  they contradict  the  interests  of  those  classes.  This 
chapter continues with the presentation of an organizational design that concerns 
· · · ·
· · · ·
political order and process, government action, legislation, and vigilance as to the 
coherence of the whole institutional  order.
Keywords  Political  power Power of society State power Popular  sovereignty 
General  will  Democracy  Political  order  and  process  Government  action 
Legislation
Chapter 8
Dunatopian  Economic System
Abstract  At center  stage of this chapter stands what may be denominated the 
‘separation principle’; that is, the principle of the separation of production from 
the  decisions  and  conflicts  concerning  income  distribution.  Such  a  separation 
prevents those conflicts from harming efﬁciency in the use of productive resources 
and enhances solidarity and social justice. In particular, the implied abolition of 
com- pany wages (with the exception of material incentives on overtime work) 
makes  it  possible  to  erase   exploitation  and  enable   the  achievement   of  full 
employment.   A profound reform of the ﬁnancial system is also delineated, aimed 
at preventing crises caused by  ﬁnancial speculations mainly at the international 
level,  and  aimed  also at ending the present dependence of production on the 
hegemony of ﬁnance. In this chapter, the role of the entrepreneur, the proﬁt rate 
and dynamic competition are highlighted. Here the importance of the rule results-
responsibilities for the  efﬁ-  ciency of the economy is greatly in evidence. We 
insist on the notion of the market used and intended as a pure mechanism for the 
imputation of costs and efﬁciency,  and hence puriﬁed of acquisitive selﬁshness; 
thereby combining altruism with a sound competitive spirit.
Keywords Separation principle · Solidarity · Social justice · Exploitation · Entrepreneurship · 
Proﬁt rate · Dynamic competition · The market · Results-responsibilities · Financial system
· · ·
· · ·
imply technocratic degeneration; in fact, political functions do not properly need 
technical competence, for they concern ends (i.e. ethical-ideological options) not 
means, to which technical competence refers.
Keywords Forms of power Domination-power Service-power Responsibility 
criteria Free will Judicial order (independence of judges versus their free will) 
Technocracy
Chapter 9
Non-market Productive Activities 
and Other Aspects of the Dunatopian 
Social System
Abstract Public goods and services do not generate a market demand and a price 
system. For this reason, control of efﬁciency and responsibility in their production 
and distribution is subject to a number of difﬁculties. However, this handicap can 
be  partly  surmounted  in  a  variety  of  ways,  such  as,  for  instance,  cost-beneﬁt 
analyses of infrastructures. In the case of semi-public services, such as health and 
educa- tional services, which are characterized by individual demand but, also, by 
the myopia of utilizers, public preferences provide a weak help in determining the 
degree of efﬁciency and responsibility; this difﬁculty is, however, lower in edu- 
cational and welfare services, wherein consumers’ ability to judge is higher than 
in  other ﬁelds. In short, different criteria for the control of efﬁciency and 
responsibility must be deﬁned in the various ﬁelds of public administration. We 
dedicate attention to possible solutions.
Keywords  On public goods and services  · Semi-public services  · Efﬁciency in 
public administration · Waste and inefﬁciencies · Responsibility
Chapter 10
The Reasons Why the Ideologies, 
Political and Economical Institutions 
and Public Interventions on Earth 
Obstruct
the Building of a Supranational Order
Abstract In this chapter the need for a supranational order and some international 
political  authority  is  highlighted.  This  need  derives  primarily from economics, 
which is increasingly characterized by an international breath. We emphasize the 
growing hegemony of  the  ﬁnancial  side  of  economic  life,  a  hegemony that  is 
fostered by the political fragmentation of the world, and which generates specu- 
lation,  crises,  growing  disequilibria  and  fraudulent  actions  associated  with 
ﬁnancial power. A scientiﬁc treatment of the institutions required by the present 
historical age, which is a main object of this book, will be of great value, and will 
prove indispensable in stimulating the building of international  agreements and 
institu- tions in the face of the increasing interconnections among the regions of 
the Earth. Such a treatment, and the related international actions, is indispensable 
if we are to overcome the present organizational degenerations associated with the 
main form of international power: the hegemony of ﬁnance capital.
Keywords Supranational order · Financial power · Speculation · Hegemony of
ﬁnancial capital over production · International agreements and institutions
Chapter 11
On the Methods of Science on 
Earth and on Dunatopia
Abstract  This chapter brings into focus and deepens our treatment of what we 
consider, from a scientiﬁc point of view, the main problem afflicting the present 
social  world:  the  question  of  method.  We underline  the  erroneousness  of  the 
assertion as to the uniqueness of scientiﬁc method and clarify the reasons why it is 
not so, namely, the completely different constitutive character of social from 
natural reality, the ﬁrst being a human construct, the second a predetermined and 
relatively steady order with which men interact. Social reality is, in one sense, at 
the mercy of the constructive and creative behavior of humans, and this points to 
the need for an organizational view in both the management and the study of such 
a reality. Man is the author of social changes and hence can penetrate the reasons 
for them; yet  a merely observational method cannot but fail in this regard. We 
return  but  now  deepen  the  exposition  in  Chap.  2 of  the  most  appropriate 
methodological approach to social studies and provide an extended discussion of 
the  usefulness  of  this  method  in  clarifying  the  frequent  methodological 
misunderstandings  that  afflict the  social  sciences  today.  Clariﬁcations  of  the 
confusions  associated  with  both  spon-  taneity  and  revolutionary  attitudes  are 
provided, together with some interpretation of social reality and history.
· ·
· ·Keywords  Method  of social sciences Social  reality  versus Natural reality 
Human creativeness Organizational view as appropriate to social reality Against 
spontaneity and revolutionary attitudes
Chapter 12
The Ethical Problem on Earth
and on Dunatopia. Ethics and Religion
Abstract  Confusion  over  the  appropriate  method  of  the  social  sciences  has 
aggravated the social dimension of ethical questions, which have become 
confused, controversial, and, indeed, a true value-ideological puzzle. The chapter 
presents an overview of the current confusion on ethics, its main causes and its 
implications. It is noted that use of the observation-veriﬁcation method puts ethics 
outside science, for such a method is unable to provide a scientiﬁc explanation of 
values. The result of this exclusion is the so-called doctrine of ethical relativism, 
which assigns a free choice with regard to values, a position only contradicted by 
the no less antisci- entiﬁc claim that ethics is an object of faith. One result is that 
ethics becomes one of the exacerbating causes of conflicts among people. Making 
use of our notions of functional and ontological imperatives, this chapter criticizes 
some of the main sociological treatments of ethics, most notably those associated 
with the notion of natural rights and utilitarianism, but also some aspects of later 
Christian  teachings  and capitalistic  ideas  as  well.  A reinterpretation  of  the so-
called secularization movement is  offered.  We unmask the idea that,  in ethics, 
everyone  has  reason  for  his  choices  from  his  own  point  of  view,  and  we 
demonstrate the erroneousness of any explicit renunciation of the possibility of 
providing scientiﬁc explanations of ethical problems.
Keywords Ethics · Ethical relativism · Ethical absolutism · Ethical objectivism 
(the  scientiﬁc  explanation  of  fundamental  ethical  values)  ·  Natural  rights  · 
Utilitarianism · Secularization movement
Chapter 13
On the Transition from Capitalism 
to Dunatopism
Abstract This chapter presents a summation of the themes and arguments of the 
· ·
book. The possibility—and the signiﬁcance—of building on Earth an economic 
and  social  system similar  to  that  described  on our  hypothetical  twin planet  is 
investi-  gated. We consider such a construction project in light of important 
institutions and well established forms of civilization operating on Earth, as well 
as the territorial and  social  disequilibria,  injustice  and frauds  that  increasingly 
afflict  our  terrestrial  societies and which are stimulated by the play of power, 
interests and speculations of  ﬁnancial  capital  within our international  planetary 
order.  The  possibility—indeed,  for many aspects, the necessity—of devising 
means of transition are highlighted, and such practical  solutions are  contrasted 
with  the  disarming  contents  of  utopian  tra-  dition and the fertility of some 
religious teachings. The conclusion that results from this comparison emphasizes 
the crucial importance of the forms of power in giving substance to the necessary 
transition towards a more comfortable landing.
Keywords Financial capital · International planetary order · Utopian tradition · 




Abstract  Some  concluding  remarks  are  displayed  here,  concerning  listeners’ 
questions on the technology of the discovered planet and the attitude of its people 
toward nature. An exhortation to give diffusion to my report on extraterrestrial  
society, notwithstanding the possible dissent of social students, is added. The role 
of  ‘Folly’  in the life of human societies, through the stimulus of creativeness as 
underlined by Erasmus of Rotterdam, is acknowledged. But we also underline a 
parallel necessity that such a role is flanked by the organizational attitude and the 
‘reason’  of humanity so that to avoid the numerous disruptive follies that have 
afflicted our Earth during history.
Keywords  Dunatopian   technology   Genetics   Environmental   science   and 
balance
Appendix
An Overview on Some 
Methodological Equivocations of the 
Social Sciences
Abstract The appendix underlines the evolutionary character of social reality and, 
hence,  of  social  science:  an  evolutionary  motion  punctuated  and  propelled  by 
institutional features and development. Nevertheless, the evolutionary theory that 
we proceed to delineate is completely different from that propounded by 
biologists, and we are compelled to criticize forcefully the frequent applications of 
Darwin’s teaching to theories of society. A sub-section of the appendix develops a 
critical  analysis  of  economics,  the so-called queen  of the social  sciences.  It  is 
shown that the most famous and admired economic theories are afflicted and made 
misleading by fundamental methodological misconceptions. Finally, a farsighted 
intuition of Medieval Christian social thought is highlighted; an intuition that has 
hitherto been  submerged  by  the  extension  of  the  Galileian  observational-
experimental method to the study of social reality.
Keywords Evolutionary institutional social theories  ·  Darwinism ·  Lamarckism · 
Schumpeterian and neo-Austrian · Economics, the queen of social sciences? · The 
organizational view of the Medieval Christian thought
Introductory note
The  development  of  social  thought  is  mainly  governed  by  certain  mainstream 
methodologies that, notwithstanding diffuse criticisms and dissatisfaction, have in 
recent years reinforced their domination. For (as we know) the prominent status of 
mainstream thought rests upon the accurate and clever use of the following well-
consolidated methodological approaches: the method of observation- veriﬁcation 
typical of the natural sciences, the abstract-rationality method typical of logical-
formal sciences, some intelligent use of the organizational view, and their 
combinations.  These mainstream methodologies  have their  origin,  in  the main, 
outside of social  thinking.  They are  responsible for  misconceptions concerning 
important traits of social reality, which have in turn sowed the seeds of a multi-  
plicity of alternative proposals on method currently assembled under the   denomi-
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nation of heterodox social thought. But innovative heterodox efforts have failed to 
establish  an  alternative  and  unitary  methodological  approach  (or  paradigm)1 
appropriate to the investigation of social reality; on occasion they have even seen 
the profession of an explicit refusal of method. The result, at the present moment, 
is  a  patchwork  of  ‘heterodox’  methodological  proposals  and  interpretations,  a 
veri- table Tower of Babel that vainly challenge  mainstream.
The  recent  harsh  conflict  between  heterodox  social  students  of  AFEP 
(Association Francaise d’Economie Politique) and orthodox social  students2 (as 
well as others and increasingly frequent academic disputations) is a case in point. 
The former defend pluralism on method as a source of innovation, while the 
second  condemn pluralism in  the  name of  scientiﬁc  rigor  and  progress.  Both 
positions are partially wrong. In fact, pluralism, if it is to be fecund and promote 
scientiﬁc progress,  needs some general  methodological  rules  allowing dialogue 
among  stu-  dents and appreciation of new proposals; but these general 
methodological rules
cannot be borrowed from the methods of the natural and logical-formal sciences, 
as orthodox students claim, for such methods are inappropriate to social reality. 
My analyses on method aim at providing a solution to such a dilemma and moving 
beyond this signiﬁcant blind-alley.
A large number of heterodox approaches, and certainly the most intriguing of 
them,  are  inspired  by  the  evolutionary  and  institutional  perspectives  and  refer 
mainly to economics. In fact, efforts to build a new paradigm on an evolutionary 
foundation were strongly stimulated by the publication, more than thirty years ago, 
of  a  well  known book on  economics  by Nelson  and  Winter.  But  the  original 
inspiration of evolutionary economics was Schumpeter’s teaching on innovation 
and entrepreneurship and the Neo-Austrian teaching on spontaneous processes and 
radical uncertainty. Also the institutional aspect has been an important source of 
inspiration  and  meditation,  for  instance  in  the  so-called  New  Institutional 
Economics, and is largely associated to the evolutionary  perspective.
It is our conviction that the combination of institutional and evolutionary views 
provides the most likely candidate to provide a fecund methodological tool for the 
study and interpretation of social  events. In fact,  such a combination is mainly 
concerned with the understanding of social change and the way to organize society 
and to build up its institutions. In other words, the organizational and institutional  
character of society influences in a decisive way the pace of evolutionary change; 
while the sedimentation of changes requires the ediﬁcation of new institutions and 
organization, just as the expression institution-evolution implies.
1The term ‘paradigm’ is common; but we consider equivocal the notion of paradigm and prefer, in 
this matter, Lakatos to Khun (see Eskedt and Fusari 2010,   2014).
2The conflict is, at present, centered on the request/negation of the establishment in French 
universities of a chair on Economy and  Society.
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Institutional-Evolutionary Social Thought Versus Mainstream 
Social Thought. Why the First Has Been Unable to Defeat
the Second, Till Now, But Has Rather Contributed to Increase 
the Methodological Confusion Afflicting Social   Sciences
The current inability of the institutional-evolutionary perspective to express these 
potentialities is impressive. Such a perspective has been submerged by and, 
indeed,  also  integrated  in  the  patchwork  of  methods  distinguishing  heterodox 
social thought; as a consequence, its challenge to the mainstream has failed. This 
has been  frankly  recognized  by  a  recent  special  issue  of  the  Journal  of  
Institutional Economics (vol. 10 no. 4, December 2014) devoted to the   question.
Probably the best way to provide a quick clariﬁcation of the main reasons for 
the  failure  of  institutional-evolutionary  approaches  is  to  consider  Hodgson’s 
position on method and, in particular, his recent book, co-authored with Knudsen 
and  entitled  ‘Darwin’s  Conjecture’.  The  two  authors  base  their  proposal  on 
method principally on a strict use of Darwin’s theory of evolution. We shall show 
that  this  precise  theoretical  inspiration  largely  undermines  the  explanatory 
potentialities  of  the institutional-evolutionary view and is  a  main cause  of  the 
inability of  such a view to build up a paradigm alternative to the mainstream. 
Hodgson  and  Knudsen,  in  order  to  make  their  analyses  stringent,  begin  by 
outlining, as the kernel  of their proposal, the so-called Generalized Darwinism, 
that is, Darwin’s basic succession: variation-replication (or inheritance)-selection. 
The authors accompany this gen- eralization with some secondary speciﬁcations 
aimed at increasing the adherence of the Generalized Darwinism to the content of 
social reality. We shall see that the real  problem  is  the  methodological 
inappropriateness  to  social  reality  of  the  Darwinian  succession  variation-
replication-selection, an inappropriateness that cannot be mitigated by addition of 
details.
Hodgson and Knudsen claim: “All these writers [Mandeville, Hume, Smith, 
etc.] pointed to the emergence of undesigned social orders and institutions that 
result  from  individual  interactions.   This   was   a   highly   signiﬁcant   but 
incomplete  step. Writers such as Mandeville and Smith did not explain how the 
individuals and their dispositions had themselves evolved…. Darwin (2006) ﬁlled 
these  gaps  with the  principle  of  selection”.3 These  are  some very illuminating 
passages when it comes to the fundamental flaw of ‘Darwin’s Conjecture’. Let us 
see.
The spontaneity  hypothesis  embraced  in  such  book reduces  the  role  of  the 
organizational—institutional  aspect.  Of course,  I  do not  deny that  the  birth  of 
institutions may be the result of selection processes in the context of spontaneous 
behaviours and, hence, that Darwinism, generalized or not, can provide some 
useful insight also in social studies; but the beneﬁts are very minor in comparison 
to   the
3See Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), pp. 31 and   32.
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misconceptions that is liable to cause. The problem is that Darwinism substantially 
ignores the voluntary creation of institutions in the context of the organization and 
building of human societies.  Indeed,  strictly speaking,  the Darwinian approach 
should be referred only to animal life, not to human life. The study of the latter 
must  be  explicitly  and  strongly concerned  with the  organizational  aspect.  The 
concen-  tration of the authors on Darwinian Conjecture, which inclines to 
substantially erase the  ﬁrst term of the institutional-evolutionary perspective,  is 
rather surprising, not least because Hodgson’s other writings place great emphasis 
on  institutions.
Let’s insist in underlining that Hodgson and Knudsen’s addition of details to 
Generalized Darwinism are scarcely relevant. This is not a case of details devoted 
to the making of the basic kernel  of Darwinism adhere more closely to social  
reality. Such a kernel is, in itself, inappropriate to social reality; except in that case 
where society acts in substantially spontaneous ways and institutions result from 
the so called ‘invisible hand’, with private vices intended (following Mandeville) 
as public virtue, a rather defeatist perspective on the becoming of human societies. 
Such  statements as “Darwinism here is unavoidable” and “The Darwinian 
framework has a high degree of generality and it always requires speciﬁc auxiliary 
explanations”4 are misleading.
For further clariﬁcation, I add some other reference, mainly concerning what I 
call details: pages 48–51 of Hodgson and Knudsen’s book treat intentionality and 
its explanation, the role of belief and preferences, and their evolution. On page 48 
the authors recall Darwin’s statement that  “animals possess some power of rea- 
soning”; and also underline the ability of Darwinism to explain individual agents’ 
purpose and to consider their ability to plan their action. But the authors add: “It is 
simply that they (i.e. individual agents and organisms) do not plan or predict the 
overall outcome with others, and it is often very difﬁcult for them to do so”. Well, 
the real  problem is here.  I  can accept that, in many important  aspects, there is 
between humans and other  species  of animal a quantitative and not qualitative 
difference. Furthermore, with reference to stationary or quasi stationary societies 
I can accept as useful what the authors have to say on intentionality, artiﬁcial and 
natural selection, and so on; I can even accept some mixture of Darwinian and 
Lamarckian approach and the use of the observational method in the sense that it  
is used by biology. The real problem arises when and where human societies start 
to  experience  an  increasingly  accelerated  evolutionary  motion,  and  hence  a 
growing non-repetitiveness and radical uncertainty. This accelerated evolutionary 
behaviour comprises a situation basically different from any evolution of animal 
species,  making the observational  evolutionism inappropriate.  I  pose two basic 
questions concerning such a situation, and I invite the reader to meditate on them 
with great attention:
(a) Why are some societies able to experience a rapid evolutionary motion while 
others remain for centuries and millennia imprisoned in a stationary or quasi-
stationary state?
4See Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), p.  40.
Appendix: An Overview on Some Methodological Equivocations  … 135
(b) What methodological problems are generated by the interpretation of a reality 
characterized by growing non-repetitiveness  that  makes plainly inadequate 
observational method?
The  ﬁrst  question (a)  points to the importance of  considering the notion of  
civilization  forms  (which  are  largely  creative  constructions),  and  precisely  the 
presence  or  absence  in  the  considered  civilization  of  what  I  call  ontological  
imperatives, that is, institutions, ethical values, etc. favorable to the expression of 
the evolutionary potentialities of human beings. Here the importance of the insti- 
tutional  aspect  side  by  side  with  (and  as  the  engine  of)  the  evolutionary  one 
becomes evident. Chapter 8 of Darwin’s Conjecture tries to give a partial answer 
to  question  (a)  through  some  reference  to  habits,  culture,  language,  writing, 
customs, law. But I do not see the usefulness of imprisoning such an effort in the 
Darwinian approach. For its part, the second question (b) points to the necessity of 
a  method that  permits  understanding and managing society notwithstanding its 
rapid evolu- tionary motion; that is, the necessity of establishing a method able to 
capture those basic long-lasting institutional pillars (and reference points) that I 
denominate  functional  imperatives,  which  depend  mainly  on  the  general 
conditions of devel- opment. Here, again, the connection between the institutional 
and evolutionary sides appears central. Well, clearly both questions (a) and (b) 
show  the  need  for  a  methodological  approach  completely  different  from  the 
observational  one  (that  is,  with  completely  different  postulates  and  rules);  I 
attempt to delineate this approach in Chaps. 2 and 11, and much more accurately 
in Fusari   (2014).
The notions of functional and ontological imperatives, their institutional sub- 
stance and implications even on ethical values (ethical objectivism), the 
importance  of  the  relations  between  civilization,  functional  imperative  and 
ontological imper- atives for the interpretation of history (see the graph in Chap. 
2)—none  of  this  can  be  considered  by  Generalized  or  less  Generalized 
Darwinism.
Hodgson and Knudsen also write:  “All social scientists relying on this frame- 
work will be forced to take history into account”.5 Certainly, this is implied by the 
spontaneity view, but ‘history’ is so conceived merely in an observational sense, 
that is, almost completely excluding the organizational aspect, notwithstanding 
that this last is fundamental for understanding speciﬁcally  human  history, which 
differs  substantially  from the merely spontaneous motion of  animal  species  as 
spanned  by accidental  variations  followed by extremely  slow and long-lasting 
selection  pro-  cesses. The presence and action of intelligent decision-making 
marks the difference  between  the  social  and  the  natural  world;  a  difference 
implying, for instance, the inappropriateness of the standard heterodox criticism of 
the mainstream notions of optimization and rational choice. Of course, the absence 
of any consideration of radical  uncertainty (at  most substituted by probabilistic 
uncertainty) in the neo- classical notions above must be strongly criticized. But the 
criticism in principle of those notions operates, in practice, to the advantage of the 
current mainstream since
5Ibidem, p. 44.
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that criticism simply opposes to this a substantial, even if for the most part not 
declared, spontaneity view.
Let’s recall, at the expense of a little repetition, some aspects of our theory of 
social and historical processes that strongly underline the importance of the orga- 
nizational aspect for understanding the historical development of human societies. 
Our method highlights the great importance of the presence, in civilization forms, 
of the institutions implying what we call ontological imperatives, that is, organi- 
zational  features  stimulating  the  evolutionary  potential  of  human  beings,  the 
ability  of  humans  to  innovate  and  evolve.  A  civilization  rich  in  ontological 
imperatives  will  stimulate  evolution,  while  the  absence  of  such  imperatives 
condemns societies  to  extremely  low  evolutionary  processes.  We  have 
demonstrated  elsewhere  all  this  in  some  detail  through  a  weighty  historical 
analysis of societies: from the primitive stage, through the stationary civilizations 
of  great  bureaucratic  and  autocratic  empires,  to  modern  dynamic  societies.6 
Generalized or less generalized Darwinism completely omits these crucial aspects.
Another primary organizational category concerning social evolution is what 
we call functional imperatives, that is, organizational necessities corresponding to 
the general conditions of development distinguishing different historical ages and 
resulting from the sedimentation over time of successful innovations. A crucial 
task of social studies is to deﬁne, on the basis of the long period behaviour of the 
general conditions of development, these basic necessities: that is, organizational 
require- ments that the evolutionary thinking ignores but that nevertheless provide 
inter- pretative pillars of great value if we are to guide the organization of human 
societies the complications caused by increasing social change notwithstanding. 
For when considering the processes of social evolution, organizational necessities 
are important interpretative pillars that help us to guide the human organization of 
society, notwithstanding the complications caused by increasing social  change.
Civilizations, ontological imperatives and functional imperatives should be 
some of  the  main  fruits  and  contents  of  a  proﬁtable  methodological  view;  an 
approach,  that is, that combines observational and organizational aspects. The 
course of social and historical processes is mainly characterized and explained in 
terms of inno- vative dash followed by structural  organization, this synthesized 
mainly by the notions of ontological and functional imperatives and civilization. 
These  processes  take  a  true  institutional-evolutionary  semblance.  Let’s  give  a 
sketch  of  the  basic  interpretative  succession  that  our  approach  opposes  to  the 
Darwinian succession variation-replication-(or inheritance)-selection (even when 
including additional details), and to other views. Our interpretative succession is: 
degree  of  presence  of  ontological  imperatives  in  the  civilization  form  of  the  
considered social system— intensity of innovative dash—diffusion of innovations  
and  collateral  process  of  structural  reorganization  devoted  to  restoration  of  
organizational coherence (a process that places center stage the deﬁnition of new 
functional imperatives)—new innovative dash, etc.; a cyclical process, indeed. I 
have done much to expose    and
6See A. Fusari, The human adventure, SEAM Rome,  2000.
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verify this interpretative approach in numerous studies on economic and social 
development and the interpretation of history.7
Some other examples useful for clarifying the difference between our approach 
and the current social evolutionism can be set out. Think of the crucial question of 
power.  What  can  it  teach  us  in  the  matter  Darwinism,  Lamarckism and other 
evolutionary approaches?  Schumpeterian,  neo-Austrian and, more generally,  all 
observational  methodologies  recognize  and  so  are  able  to  consider  only 
domination-power,  generated  by  and  operating  in  the  context  of  more  or  less 
brutal processes of selection. Such methodologies are unable to deﬁne and inspect 
the important notion of service-power (see Chap. 6). More generally, what can the 
above approaches teach concerning ethics? Darwin’s Conjecture and the sponta- 
neous view of social reality cannot teach us anything here; they dislike and sub-  
stantially  avoid  the  topic,  embracing  instead  so-called  ethical  relativism,  in 
compliance with the hegemonic presence of this in social thought. Thus he who 
wants to meet the question of ethical values in coherence with Darwinism is 
obliged  to  found  his  values  on  the  brutal  phenomena  of  the  struggle  for 
existence.
Besides, the current institutional-evolutionary approaches are unable to recog- 
nize the organizational  practicability  and importance  of  the separation,  in eco- 
nomics,  of  the  side  of  production  from  that  of  the  distribution  of  wealth;  a 
separation  crucial  for  ensuring:  organizational  efﬁciency,  full  employment  and 
social justice, as widely discussed in Chap. 8. In the introduction of such chapter, 
footnote 1, we recognize that the idea of ‘separation’ (a very important intuition 
for the  analysis  of   economic   institutions)   comes   from   Pasinetti.   My   book 
on Methodological  Misconceptions in the Social  Sciences  dedicates,  mainly in 
Chap. 3, Sect. 9, a wide and critical deepening to the fecundity of such insight.8 
Pasinetti’s  principle  of  ‘separation’  was  initially  expressed  in  his  contribution 
entitled ‘Economic Theory and Institution’, for the 1992 EAEPE Conference in
7See Fusari (2000) and (2014), Eskedt and Fusari (2010), Fusari and Reati   (2013).
The bifurcations, catastrophes and singularity theories attached to the study of non-linear  
systems of equations with multiple solutions (see Thom 1985) may seem to raise some doubts on 
the disequilibrating/re-equilibrating process delineated above. I think that social students may 
consider, in a long run perspective, this argument as a mathematical joke and hence give no 
importance to the related transformation process. The bifurcations etc. occur as a part of well  
deﬁned qualitative geometrical  structures.  But a  substantial  part  of  the development  process, 
precisely the innovation-adaptation (innovation-structural organization) mechanism above 
implies, mainly through appropriate changes of structural parameters, the return from disorder to 
order; and this is, after all, what matters.
8Let’s give a brief quotation from my book on Methodological Misconceptions: “An important
merit of Pasinetti’s idea of ‘separation’ is to provide a precious analytical tool for distinguishing 
necessity  from  choice-possibility  in  the  organization  and  management  of  social  systems…. 
Unfortunately Pasinetti’s formalization places important institutional  ‘necessities’  on the right 
hand side of his ‘separation’ between the ‘natural system’ and the institutional aspect, as they are 
intended as non-fundamental. But, as just noted, institutions are now to be seen as appearing in 
both  ﬁelds, that is, in both the  ﬁeld of  ‘necessity’  and that of  ‘choice-possibility’.  See Fusari 
(2014), pp. 99 and  101.
Appendix: An Overview on Some Methodological Equivocations  … 138
Paris (with some extensive comments by G.M. Hodgson and A. Reati),9 and was 
resumed with improvements in Pasinetti (2007). But, with my great surprise, 
neither the book ‘Darwin’s Conjecture’ nor two Hodgson’s articles published in 
the Journal of Institutional Economics (vol. 10, no. 4, 2014) with attached two 
very  detailed  lists  of  references,  give  mention  of  such  fecund  Pasinetti’s 
contribution to institu- tional and evolutionary economics. The method that we 
suggest  seems to  allow a  proﬁtable  combination  between  the  institutional  and 
evolutionary aspects, obser- vation and organization, being and doing. I dare say 
that the methodology we propose is a valuable candidate in social thought, with 
the potential to replace the inconclusive patchwork offered by current heterodoxy 
and the astute but no less misleading orthodox methodological combinations.
A Criticism of the Methodological 
Foundations of the Supposed ‘Queen of the 
Social Sciences’  Economics  and  Political 
Economy
G. Lunghini has written:  “in economics the paradigm that in the course of time 
follows another  one is not necessarily progressive,  in contrast  to the other  sci- 
ences”.10  Why does this happen? I have concluded, after careful reflection (and 
I think I have shown) that this arises from great equivocations in relation to 
method. As we know, the methods that the main schools of economic and social 
thought use are two: the experimental-observational method, born from the study 
of nature; the method of abstract rationality typical of the logical-formal sciences; 
or some combination.
Neither the Neoclassical model, centered on such notions as utility, homoeco- 
nomicus, equilibrium prices, and so on, and the Classical-Marxian approach, cen- 
tered on the notions of surplus, labor value, social classes and social struggle, are 
able to provide useful teaching and knowledge on the organization of economic 
and social  systems.  The two models generate  serious misunderstandings in the 
matter,  albeit  for  opposite  reasons:  the  very  idea  of  deriving  such  knowledge 
through the mere observation of factual  reality;  the claim to derive knowledge 
from senseless abstractions.
In the Neoclassical model of the general equilibrium, history does not matter; 
the formalization of such a model is inspired by Newtonian astronomy and, more 
generally,  by the criterion that I denominate  ‘abstract rationality’, typical of the 
logical-formal sciences. The ‘realism’ of postulates is disregarded and basic eco- 
nomic  variables  such  as  radical  uncertainty,  the  entrepreneur,  the  proﬁt    rate
9See ‘The Political Economy of Diversity. Evolutionary Perspectives on Economic Order and  
Disorder’ Edited by R. Delorme and K. Dopfer, Edward Elgar,  1994.
10See Lunghini (2015).
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(properly understood, that is, not simply as a surplus or a rate of interest on 
capital), are ignored. For its part, Classical-Marxian economics has been built up 
through analysis of the functioning of capitalism.11 So, in Classical and Marxian 
thinking  history  matters  too  much,  that  is,  historic  observation  conditions  the 
whole theo- retical construct, while such thinking is unable to provide lessons as 
to the orga- nization and rethinking of social systems. As previously seen, Marx 
attributed  an  organizational  role  to  the  ‘imagination  of  history’,  which  indeed 
produced in due time the degenerations of ‘real socialism’. In short, both Classical 
and Marxian economics are strictly observational constructs. But while classical 
students have the propensity to underline, on the basis of historical observation, 
the virtues of capitalism, Marxian thought, born in a successive historical phase, 
mainly insists on the limits and contradictions of capitalism and, due to Marx’s 
strong dedication to the interpretation of history (following the methodological 
observationism), is liable to generate misinterpretations and deceit out of that strict 
observation.
Turning to more recent times, we ﬁnd Sraffa’s Neo-Ricardianism damaged by 
over-simpliﬁcation and sharing with the Neoclassical model of the general equi- 
librium an unconcern for the realism of postulates. Sraffa’s main critical contri- 
bution  concerns  the  aggregate  function  of  production  and  the  ‘reswitching  of 
techniques’; but these contributions do not affect the logical  rigor of Walrasian 
microeconomics.  Moreover,  Sraffa  ignores,  no  less  than  does  Walras,  radical 
uncertainty,  entrepreneurship,  expectation,  innovation  and  the  resulting  phe- 
nomenon of ‘dynamic competition’, as well as proﬁt properly  understood.
A much more proﬁtable position on method was developed by Keynes, and is 
distinguished by the explicit conjugation of the observational and organizational 
aspects, being and doing. Keynes starts with the demonstration of a very important 
phenomenon, ‘the deﬁciency of effective demand’ (through profound reflection on 
the phenomena of uncertainty,  entrepreneurship, and expectations). The work of 
this author contains important lessons on the organization of social systems 
(welfare  state,  deﬁcit  spending,  etc.)  that  have  propitiated  fortune  and  made 
possible the advent of a true golden age of capitalism with regard to social justice,  
welfare politics, employment, and the dynamics of  wages.
Unfortunately, the principle of effective demand is only one of the realist pos- 
tulates that should inspire and lead the organization of the economy. This 
limitation has condemned Keynesian teaching to great distortions. In particular, 
the abuse of  deﬁcit  spending,  a  formidable instrument  of social  consent  and a 
useful tool to attenuate social conflict, has promoted a growing public debt; and 
this in turn has favored the advent of a different and opposite situation than that 
treated  by  the  principle  of  effective  demand;  has  generated,  that  is  to  say,  a 
situation  in  which  production  is  disturbed  by  high  taxation,  waste  and 
inefﬁciencies in public administration. And the result is an irresistible push toward 
restrictive policies, with
11G. Lunghini writes: “Economics is born as science of capitalism”. See Lunghini, Ibidem, p. 3.
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a consequent fall of investment, production and the demand for goods. We see, 
therefore, that the organization and management of the economy need much more 
than the inspiration of the principle of effective  demand.
This confusion on method allows mainstream economics, through clever even 
if ﬁctitious adjustments (which include the pretense of incorporating Keynes as a 
special case,  the idea of rational expectations, and the introduction of technical 
progress to the function of production), to preserve its dominating  power.
The organization of the economic system must be such as to meet three main 
exigencies: productive efﬁciency, social justice and full employment. These exi- 
gencies require the theoretical and practical  ‘separation’  of income distribution, 
with its  related  conflicts,  from the  ﬁrm,  as  we have  clariﬁed  in  Chap.  8.  But, 
contrary to this, Neoclassical and Classical-Marxian economics, as well as Srafﬁan 
and  Keynesian  economics,  are  all  based  on  the  hypothesis  (suggested  by  the 
observation of historical events) that income distribution takes place largely inside 
the ﬁrm. And there is the rub. In fact, the modality of income distribution 
described above prevents  the requisite engagement with these three exigencies. 
Such a dis- tribution modality is an indispensable constituent part of capitalism, 
but it is not necessary that it must be  so.
The observational  method states that  the market,  the entrepreneur and proﬁt 
(often identiﬁed with the interest on capital) are merely capitalistic organizational  
institutions. These institutions were disliked by  ‘real socialism’, which therefore 
attempted  the  elimination of  the  market  and  the  entrepreneur;  but  in  doing so 
generated organizational contradictions worse than the capitalist ones. For their 
part, social democracies and self-management have held that income distribution 
should be largely determined inside the ﬁrm; but, in this way have fallen into the 
organizational contradictions underlined above.12
Chapter  8 shows that the market, the entrepreneur, economic decentralization 
and the rate of proﬁt (this to be conceived distinctly from the rate of interest on 
capital, that is, as a fundamental indicator of the degree of success of the entre-  
preneur’s action, but considered apart from its attribution) are all indispensable in 
modern  dynamic  economies.  But  it  also demonstrates  the  importance  of  over- 
coming their capitalistic contents, that is, their links with income distribution, in 
order to make possible the achievement of full employment and social justice, and 
to avoid the hegemony and great degenerations of the international  ﬁnancial sys- 
tem, etc. These theoretical developments need a method that combines the obser- 
vation  and  the  organization  points  of  view,  and  which  is  able  to  distinguish
12J.S. Mill was the only economist that tried to escape this confusion. He asserted the indepen-  
dence  of  income  distribution  from  production,  underlining  that  the  second  is  submitted  to  
natural laws and technical requirements, while the ﬁrst is a matter of choice. But he did not 
prove such an assertion and this has allowed Neoclassic economists’  pretension to prove the 
dependence of income distribution from production that has caused diffuse prejudices on the  
organization of the economy.
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‘necessity’ from ‘choice-possibility-creativeness’ in the organization, 
interpretation and management of social systems. More speciﬁcally, it needs a 
method that allows the identiﬁcation of long-lasting aspects and organizational 
pillars of social systems,  primarily  by  way  of  the  notions  of  ontological  and 
functional imperatives and the notion of civilization forms. This is crucial if we 
are to be able to understand and manage social systems despite their growing non-
repetitiveness caused, in the main, by the technological and scientiﬁc progress of 
modern societies. But this refers to the ﬁrst part of this Appendix and to Chaps. 2 
and    11.
Considerations on Christian Social Thought 
From Galileo to the Encyclical Laudato si
It may be of interest to underline some afﬁnities of our proposal on the method of 
the social sciences and the Medieval Christian thought, which attributed a great  
importance to the organizational aspect and, in a sense, to the combination of 
being and doing. Christian teaching has insisted, from its origin, on some very 
important  ontological  imperatives,  often  speciﬁed  by  Gospel:  the  role  of 
individual,  his  dig-  nity and the respect for his autonomy and creativeness, 
tolerance, social justice, the notion of service-power, even though those principles 
were often conﬁned, in the practice and sometimes due to opportunism, to the 
spiritual sphere. Moreover, these  fecund  positions  were  damaged  by  some 
connected shortcomings, e.g. Aquinas’ insistence on the labour theory of value 
and its presumed ethical substance. But
B. Forte has written: “the archaic world and also Greek culture did not know the 
inﬁnite dignity of  the person as a unique and singular  historical  subjects”  (see 
B. Forte 1991, p.  12).
The vicissitude of Christian social thought is indeed very instructive in relation 
to  the  deceitful  power  of  methodological  equivocations.13 A  profound  lacuna 
afflicted the Roman Church’s organizational  view on society:  an absence  of a 
distinction between  ‘necessity’  and  ‘choice-possibility-creativeness’,  which dis- 
tinction (as we know) is a true backbone of the organizational  view. In conse- 
quence, the beginnings of medieval dynamism as a result of the initiative of the  
capitalist  entrepreneur  and the capitalist  market  induced the Roman Church to 
profess  great  hostility  to  three  of  the  basic  institutions  required  by  economic 
dynamics: the entrepreneur, the market and the proﬁt, which it saw as vehicles of 
exploitation and corruption. The inquiry on the organization of human societies 
ignored (and still ignores today) the fact that, while the entrepreneur, the market 
and  proﬁt  rate  (this  intended  distinctly  from the  interest  on  capital  and  as  an 
account- ability variable, that is in its monitoring role of indispensable indicator of 
the degree
13For better clariﬁcations on this topic see Fusari (2014), chapter 10, section 10.6 entitled ‘Further 
considerations on religious social thought: faith and  reason’.
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of success of the entrepreneur’s action but apart from its attribution) are indeed 
organizational  necessities  of  dynamic  societies,  their  capitalist  content  simply 
expresses a choice of civilization.14 In other words, a primary recommendation of 
the organizational perspective was ignored: the ‘separation principle’ between the 
ﬁrm’s productive activity and the side of income distribution, with the implied 
notion of the market as ‘a pure mechanism of imputation of costs and efﬁciency’ 
(see Chap. 8); that is, the market as distinct from its capitalist   content.
This confusion establishes a real impotence in the face of capitalist 
exploitation; it very much contributes to the survival of capitalism as it makes its 
abolition resemble the throwing out of the dirty bath water (capitalism) along with 
the baby (that is, the  market  and  the  entrepreneur)  with  very  negative 
consequences on the dynamic motion of modern societies. In fact, this senseless 
opposition on the part of Roman Christianity against the entrepreneur, the market 
and proﬁt intended as stamped with  an  inevitable  capitalist  imprint,  was 
counteracted by the Protestant ethics (empha- sized by M. Weber), which gave a 
push to the capitalist spirit. This has resulted in an erroneous observational imprint 
on the organizational view, that is, an imprint absent from which is the distinction 
between  the  organizational  necessities  of  the  phase of  social  historical 
development in action and the rising civilization form.
In addition, Christian thought pretended to extend the organizational view also 
to the study of nature, that is, it intended to penetrate the reason why God had 
created the natural world as it is; a senseless pretence that, due the unfathomable 
character of divine will, allows the designation of paralyzing organizational forms 
of human societies in the name of faith. Galileo demonstrated the 
inappropriateness  of  such  an  organizational  view for  the  understanding  of  the 
natural  world and substituted for  it  the observational  view: a position strongly 
opposed by the Roman Church for a long time.15 In the end, the great practical and 
theoretical success of the observation-veriﬁcation method for the study of natural 
phenomena gave rise, by imitation, to a hegemonic extension of the observational 
method also to   social
14Some effects  of  misconceptions  in  this  matter  are  illustrated  by the  vicissitudes  of  Italian  
managerial public ﬁrms operating in the market. Initially these ﬁrms, under the guidance of great 
managers, performed very proﬁtable actions in the service of the national economy. But more 
recently a total disregard for the monitoring role of the proﬁt rate has had very negative effects: 
instead of producing proﬁts to the advantage of the national budget, public ﬁrms have started to 
‘achieve’ ever greater losses, covered through the provision of large endowment funds (end 
hence public debt) by the state, Meanwhile, the guidance of public entrepreneurs who are loyal to 
those  politicians  who  have  secured  their  nominations  and  very  high  rewards,  but  lack 
entrepreneurial skills and attitude, has ensured that the inefﬁciency of those  ﬁrms has reached 
scandalous dimensions.
15When I was a very young man living in a village near to L’Aquila, the missionaries, who every 
year  came to give  sermons in  the parish church, opposed with animosity Darwin ’s teaching 
concerning biology and even sympathized with the doubts of old people on the movement of
rotation and revolution of the Earth.  I  was scandalized by such an attitude, which made me 
suspicious of religious thinking. A suspiciousness that persisted till 25 years ago, when my deep  
historical studies on societies, civilizations and religions existing or once existent on Earth con- 
vinced me that Christian religion has been much more favorable than other religions to social 
development.
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sciences: an extension that was helped by the (just considered) ambiguous obser- 
vational  inclination of  the organizational  view and that  has  represented  a very 
unfortunate and misleading event indeed.
These methodological misspeciﬁcations have deprived the organizational view 
of Christian social thought of the ‘separation’ principle, with its enormous power 
to promote social justice and to warrant the role of the domestic and international 
ﬁnancial  systems of  servants,  instead  of  masters  of production, that  is,  putting 
capital  at the service of production, not vice-versa (see section  “The Financing 
System of Firms, the Abolition of Interest  Rates and the Principle of Effective 
Demand”, in Chap. 8). The great importance of the above possibilities and per- 
spective for the ecumenical action of the Roman Church and other religions, 
mainly  in  underdeveloped  countries,  is  evident;  yet  such  potential  actions  are 
opposed  by  various  contradictions  and  derided  as  mere  utopianism  by  the 
dominant, but the- oretically impoverished and at times servile social thought of 
our day. There is more. The methodological equivocations underlined here leave a 
deep imprint upon contemporary Christian social  doctrine,  leaving it  unable to 
oppose the social sci- ence practiced within the universities; an academic social 
thought that looks with disdain upon Christian social thought, which it considers 
lacking stringency from scientiﬁc point of view, but which has the great merit of 
being based on substantial good sense.
It is important to recall, at this point, another primary teaching of the Medieval 
Church,  namely,  the Franciscan view on the relation between man and natural 
world. Such a teaching has remained marginal, mainly as a consequence of the 
push that the natural sciences have given to human skills in the dominating of 
nature and putting it at the service of society.  These results have facilitated the  
transfer of the observational-experimental method, as author of such marvels, also 
to the study of human societies, thereby strengthening the presence of domination 
in their gov- ernment. The well known biblical statement on the mandate given to 
man to subdue nature  has  been  long interpreted  as  religious  approval  of  such 
behavior.
The encyclical states: “But today we cannot avoid acknowledging that an eco-  
logical approach is always obliged to become a social approach that must 
integrate justice into discussions of the environment in order to lend an ear both 
to the shout of the Earth and of poor men.”16 A sort of methodological short circuit 
emerges  here  that  generates  harsher  and  harsher  inconveniencies:  the  great 
advance of the natural sciences has entailed the great submission of the natural 
world  to  man,  and this  has  favored  domination power  to  the  detriment  of  the 
notion of service-power evoked by the Gospel. By speaking of the technocratic 
paradigm,  the  encyclical  criticizes  the  experimental  method  as  a  technique  of 
domination. But which is the alternative method? The encyclical says nothing on 
this  point.
Unfortunately, social encyclicals are quite lacking in method. I have considered 
this question in my book on Methodological Misconceptions in the Social 
Sciences, mainly in its  ﬁnal chapter. The negative references of the encyclical to 
the   market
16Encyclic Laudato si, Edizioni San Paolo, p.  62.
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and proﬁt may generate serious equivocation. The two organizational forms above 
that,  as  we  know,  constitute  important  organizational  necessities  of  modern 
dynamic economies, are nevertheless strongly condemned by the new encyclical; a 
condemnation based on the hypothesis that those institutional forms have neces- 
sarily capitalist content. The encyclical  does not pay attention to scientiﬁc (and 
hence methodological) aspects, probably as a consequence of the evident unrelia- 
bility of current social science. Consequently, there is no perception of the merit, 
for the understanding and government of modern human societies, of the organiza- 
tional vision of the Medieval Church.
The encyclical  says:  “if…  we do not  know objective  truth or  principles  as 
universally valid, laws are considered as arbitrary formulations and hence 
obstacles  to avoid”.17 But the encyclical says nothing on the way to derive 
objective truths, of  the  kind,  for  instance,  of  what  we  call  ‘organizational 
necessities’. This episte- mological limitation works to the advantage of pseudo-
social science; in particular, its implications serve the interests of autocratic rulers 
and ﬁnancial  speculators.
Science has garnered great prestige from the beneﬁts it has given to humankind; 
therefore, the mystiﬁcations enacted in its name exert great influence if they are 
not unmasked. If we are to efﬁcaciously combat the mystiﬁcation of pseudo-social 
sciences, it is necessary to start again from the organizational vision of the 
Medieval Church but referred to society (albeit, this time, not extended to natural 
world). That is, it is necessary to start from the clariﬁcation of the equivocation 
expressed by Galileo’s condemnation. The achievements of the natural sciences 
and the domi- nation logic implied by the experimental method have favored a 
great  development  of  the  capitalist  world.18 But  this  impulse  seems  to  be 
exhausting   itself.
Christian social thought can offer, through its organizational vision, an 
important scientiﬁc contribution; one that promises to mitigate the great confusion 
that human  societies  are  living  through  today.  But  such  a  contribution  is 
conditioned on a propensity to innovate, and Roman Church has learned, through 
long experience, to  distrust  innovation  and  the  innovative  spirit.  The  cultural 
revival that followed Feudal times was very much propelled by the monasteries 
and other religious institutions within which famous thinkers enunciated fearless 
innovations.  The  interlude  of  the  great  and  irreverent  culture  of  Humanism 
followed,  together  with  the  torment  of  schisms,  reformations  and  counter 
reformations. Afterwards, the naturalist landfall of the cultural efflorescence of the 
Renaissance opened the road to the great technical and scientiﬁc developments of 
the  modern  world;  but  this  nat-  uralist  landfall  has  favored  the  blindness  and 
aridity of current social  thinking.
The cautious conservative attitude that these vicissitudes have fostered in the 
Roman Church appear today culpable, for it is guilty of serious omissions. In fact, 
the  ecumenical  action  of  the  Church  is  in  need  (as  previously  seen)  of great
17Ibidem, p. 120.
18Calvinism,  which  connected  the  notion of  predestination  with  the success  achieved  during 
one’s life, and hence identiﬁed economic success as a sign of predestination, blessed the work of 
capitalism far beyond the more appropriate Lutheran insistence on duty and responsibility. See, 
on this matter, A. Fusari, Human adventure, pp.  606–613.
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innovations carried out in social thought, primarily through the  ‘separation prin- 
ciple’, which should be facilitated by the openness and fertile intellectual position 
of Christianity in the ﬁeld. We hope that our analysis may stimulate an awareness 
of such need and intellectual fertility, thus opening the door to the connected great 
perspectives.
So deep methodological misconceptions of social thought greatly affects ethics. 
The clash of civilizations and cruel oppositions between people and social systems 
that bathed in blood the ﬁrst half of the last century are at work also in the present 
day; a product largely of the way that Western social and philosophical thoughts 
has conceived of the question of ethical values, mainly through the hegemony of 
cultural relativism that postulates a kind of free choice with regard to ethics and 
civilization forms. As we know, ethical relativism has been (and is) complemented 
by a no less erroneous notion: cultural absolutism, assessing that ethical values are 
a matter of faith (see Chap. 12). There is a scientiﬁc way to overcome these mis- 
conceptions;  it  is  represented  by  what  I  call  ethical  objectivism,  that  is,  the 
demonstration that very important values can be the object of scientiﬁc investiga- 
tion, a matter on which this booklet and some other books of mine19 insist, pre- 
tending to show the scientiﬁc nature of important  values.
Unfortunately, this scientiﬁc possibility is denied by many social scientists who 
claim to adhere to a version of  ‘Hume’s law’  that ethical judgments cannot be 
derived from factual judgments. But Hume in fact was very cautious with regard 
to  such  a  presumed  law,  which  has  been  loudly  proclaimed  by  more  recent 
students  and,  in  a  sense,  consecrated  by  the  Weberian  notion  of  ‘diffuse 
rationality’, that is, the spontaneous tendency of social systems in the very long 
run towards organi-  zational  rationality through selective processes  of trial  and 
error (for discussion on this see, Chap. 9 on Weber and paragraph 10.7 on Hume 
in my book ‘Methodological Misconceptions…’).
Let me give some important examples of ethical principles that can be scien- 
tiﬁcally expressed through the organizational method. The Christian religion states 
that men are God’s sons and, as such, brothers. This implies principles of 
solidarity  and  equal  dignity  among  men.  The  scientiﬁc  content  of  these  two 
principles  can  be  proved  by  reasoning  on  the  question  of  individual  skills, 
considered in relation to the rational and efﬁcient organization of human societies. 
We have treated this topic widely in Chap. 7. Here it is enough to repeat that these 
skills vary greatly among individuals, and that they are allotted at random among 
men (and, we may add, also among animals) by a ‘natural lottery’. A primary need 
in the development of human societies and the self-fulﬁllment of each individual, 
and  in  the  increasing  of  the  degrees  of  personal  satisfaction,  concerns  the 
knowledge and appropriate use of individual skills. To meet this need requires the 
ethical principle of equal dignity and of solidarity, combined with the separation 
principle.  (These  principles  go well  beyond  the  ethical  content  that  the 
scientiﬁcally wrong theory of labour value pretends to express). People are very 
eager to use their skills, especially their
19See Eskedt and Fusari (2010,  2014).
Appendix: An Overview on Some Methodological Equivocations  … 146
highest ones, independently of making money through them (separation principle). 
Living in poverty, Vincent van Gogh painted masterpieces; if he had not been so 
poor he probably would have produced more paintings, but if he sold his paintings 
at today prices he would no doubt have produced less valuable works, for wealth 
dissipates energy and corrupts the will. It is a primary interest and desire of the 
individual to use his skills. Only the lowest and disgusting jobs need monetary 
incentives in order to be practiced. We have seen all this in our discussions of 
Dunatopian society. It is not enough to proclaim the duty of mercy for the humble 
and afflicted peoples; it also needs to insist on the  ‘necessity’  of such a duty as 
required by reasons of rationality and organizational efﬁciency of social  systems.
It is striking to observe that the above ethical principles, fundamental for the 
efﬁcient organization and development of human societies and decisive for indi- 
viduals’ satisfaction and self-fulﬁllment, have been badly violated everywhere in 
the world. The ancient Greeks had great consideration for the individual, but with 
strong limitations: non-Greeks were considered barbarians and Aristotle accepted 
slavery as natural. The Church proclaimed the abolition of slavery, but accepted 
the institution of serfdom. A vast range of skills belonging to the masses of slaves 
and  serfs  remained  undiscovered.  Racism  is  present  even  in  our  own  days. 
Gypsies set their sons to robbery instead of sending them to school; billions of 
children  live  in  conditions of total decay in underdeveloped countries, as in 
Europe during the great  industrial  revolution  and  in  the  Sicilian  mines  of  G. 
Verga’s novel Rosso Malpelo. The Muslim world discriminates against one half of 
its population, women— consigning theirs skills to oblivion. Living conditions in 
the world would have been higher and the development of civilizations more rapid 
and enjoyable if the skills of so many down-and-outs had been put to good use. 
Men are  different  and equal  to  each  other:  different  in skills  and dispositions, 
equal in dignity. This observation and principle merits great consideration: ethical  
principles of equal dignity and solidarity represent indeed great  ‘organizational  
necessities’, thereby partaking of a scientiﬁc substance.
I do not see any reason why, in the name of factuality, the study of “the list of 
crimes,  the  follies  and  the  misfortune  of  mankind”,  as  Gibbon deﬁned human 
history,  should have scientiﬁc character  and instead the search  for  institutions, 
organizational proposals, etc. directed to prevent these follies must be considered 
absent of scientiﬁc content.
What we see in the landscape of social thinking is something similar to 
Galileian vicissitude, but with opposite content: as we said, in Galileo’s time the 
Roman Church wrongly proclaimed the extension of hers organizational view also 
to the study of nature, contrary to Galileo’s observational-experimental proposal 
on  method;  in  our  time,  by  contrast,  social  science  wrongly  insists  on  the 
extension of the observational view also to the social world, in opposition to the 
much more pertinent organizational view.
Long historical experience shows, let’s repeat, that the best guarantee for the 
survival of capitalism is constituted by the refusal of the market and proﬁt, in the 
absence of a speciﬁcation that the refusal must be referred to the capitalist market 
and proﬁt.
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Two  teachings  of  the  Medieval  Church  seem  to  express  quasi-prophetical 
intuitions in the light of modern experience: its organizational vision, albeit 
referred to human societies only and not also to natural  world; and Franciscan  
ecological teaching. The organizational vision has been defeated by the extension 
of  the  method  of  the  natural  sciences  to  social  thought,  in  opposition  to  the 
previous pretension of extending that vision also to the study of the natural world, 
by  which  the  Church  opposed  Galileo.  For  its  part,  the  Franciscan  ecological 
conception has been neglected due to impressive technological achievements that 
have seemed to give substance to the biblical statement on man as master of the  
world,  thus  probably  contributing  to  the  acceptance  of  the  hegemony  of  the 
experimental method by Christian social thought.
The recent encyclical dedicated to Franciscan ecological thought merits great 
attention. But the encyclical will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to yield results in the absence of a 
recovery of the organizational vision, in particular, if the ‘necessity’ of the market 
and proﬁt rate, but conjugated to the separation principle, is not understood. If 
these  ‘necessities’  continue  to  be  considered  as  indissolubly  linked  to  their 
capitalist contents, we shall remain imprisoned in capitalism and its great scientiﬁc 
ally, the observation-experimental method as used in the study and interpretation 
of the social world.
To be affective, the message of  ‘Laudato si’ needs to remedy the lack of sci- 
entiﬁc character that afflicts social thought, thereby allowing for the clariﬁcation 
of the organizational necessities and ethical objectiveness that this booklet largely 
discusses. Hitherto, the dynamics of Earthly societies has been driven by a 
predator spirit and domination attitude; in our days, it is an urgent need that it be 
based on the spirit of service.
Eighteen centuries were required to come from Archimedes and Alexandrian 
School’s scientiﬁc achievements to Galilei (and speciﬁcally, to come from a well 
known  insight  of  Aristarchus  of  Samos,  adverse  to  Ptolemaic  system,  to 
Copernicus).  I dare hope that the substantial correctness and fecundity of some 
insights of Medieval Christian thought on the method of social sciences will be 
quickly perceived after ﬁve centuries of growing confusion. Modern dynamic 
world  cannot  further  wait  for  clariﬁcations;  even  more  Christian  teaching  and 
action, which have mainly to do with society, cannot wait for   clariﬁcations.
References
Campanella, T. (1990). Sun City. La Spezia: Fratelli Melita  Editori
Commons, J. R. (1990). Institutional economics : Its place in political economy. New Brunswick, 
London : Transaction Publishers
Darwin, C. (2006). The origin of species. Turin: Bollati-Boringhieri
Forte, B. (1991). Theology of history. Brescia: Edizioni Paoline 
Dewey, J (2003). Political writings. Rome: Donzelli
Delorme, R. & K. Dopfer, edited by (1994). The political economy of diversity. Evolutionary  
perspectives on economic order and disorder. Edward  Elgar
Appendix: An Overview on Some Methodological Equivocations  … 148
Ekstedt, H., & Fusari, A. (2010). Economic theory and social science. Problems and revisions.
London/New York: Routledge
Ferrero, G. (1981). Power. Milan: Sugarco Edizioni
Fusari A. (1985). Problems of analysis and interpretation of economic, social and historic processes. Rome: CREF 
Editions
Fusari, A. (2000). The Human adventure. An inquiry into the ways of people and civilizations.
Rome: SEAM editions.
Fusari, A. (2014). Methodological misconceptions in the social sciences. Rethinking social thought and social processes. 
Springer: Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York,  London
Fusari, A. & Reati. A. (2013), ‘Endogenizing tschnical change: Uncertainty, proﬁts, entrepreneurship. A long-term view of 
sectoral dynamics’. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics (SCED) 24, 76-100
Hodgson, G. M. & T Knudsen (2010). Darwin’s Conjecture. The search for general principles of social and economic  
evolution. Chicago: The University of Chicago  Press
Hume D. (1997). An inquiry concerning the principles of moral. Rome/Bari: Laterza editions (with English text)
Keynes, J.M. (1973; 1936). The general theory of employment, interest and money. London: Macmillan
Lunghini G. (2015), Le frontiere delle teorie economiche. I paradigmi e la storia. Convegno Lincei su Frontiere
Mill J. S (1963) (In M. Robson (Gen. Ed.). The collected works of John Stuart Mill (33 vols).
Toronto University Press, Toronto
Montesquieu (1989), L’esprit de lois. Milan: Rizzoli
Nelson, R R. and Winter S. G. 1983, Anevolutionary theory of economic change. Cambridge, MA/London: Belknap, 
Harvard University Press
Nozick, R. (2000), Anarchy, state and utopia. Milan: Il Saggiatore Ockam, G. (1999) 
Philosopher and politics. Milan:  Rusconi
Pasinetti, L. L. (2007). Keynes and the Cambridge Keynesians. A ‘Revolution in Economics’ to be accomplished. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Pasinetti, L. L. (1992). Economic Theory and Institutions. EAEPE Conference in Paris Pope Francesco (2015), 
Encyclic ‘Laudato si’, Edizioni San  Paolo
Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice. Milan: Feltrinelli, and Cambridge (MA): The Belknap Press, Harward University
Ricardo, D. (1976). On the principles of political economy and taxation. Milan:   ISEDI
Sraffa, P. (1960), Production of commodities by means of commodities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Thom R. (1985). Modelli matematici della morfogenesi, Torino: Boringhieri Thucydides (1984), 
Peloponnesus war. Milan: Garzanti
Tocqueville A. (1992), De la démocratie en Amérique, Milan : Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli Walras, L. (1974). Elements  
d’économie politique pure. Turin:  UTET
Weber, M. (1974), The method of historical and social sciences. Turin:   Einaudi
Witt, U. (2009), Novelty and the bounds of unknowledge in economics, Journal of Economic Methodology, vol. 16, n° 4
Zamagni, S., Scazzieri, R., & Sen, A. (2008) Markets, money and history. Essays in honor of  sir
J. Hicks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
